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INTRODUCTION: SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND COMMONSENSE 
1. SCIENTIFIC REALISM 
Scientific realism involves two key claims. First, science aims primarily at 
truth. Second, we can justifiably believe that our successful scientific 
theories achieve, or at least approximate, this aim. The contemporary 
scientific realism debate turns on the acceptability of these claims. To 
acquire a more robust picture of scientific realism, let us identify some of 
the related theses on which these key claims rest. 
In opposition to, say, solipsists, the scientific realist insists that there 
exists an 'external' world with which we interact. Contra social con-
structivists, the scientific realist holds that this world includes events, 
processes, and/or entities that are not contingent on our beliefs. Scientific 
realists take truth to be objective and to express a correspondence relation 
between statements and the world. Such a conception of truth is often 
juxtaposed against those conceptions espoused by internal realists (e.g., 
Hilary Putnam, Brian Ellis).! Opposing idealists such as Berkeley, the 
scientific realist maintains further that we can be justified in believing that 
the objects we observe exist and that our basic claims about their observable 
properties are true. In contrast to classical instrumentalists, such as Ernst 
Mach, positivists (e.g., Moritz Schlick, Rudolph Carnap) , as well as 
fictionalists, operationaiists, and phenomenalists, the scientific realist 
construes scientific theories literally; most terms contained in scientific 
theories are intended to refer to real entities.2 Scientific realists hold that, in 
general, theory change in science has been rational and progressive. 
Moreover, scientific realists tend to espouse the view that progress in 
science is determined by the extent to which its primary aim is achieved (or 
approximated). 
These tenets of scientific realism collectively serve to provide a 
framework within which the contemporary debate on scientific realism 
takes place. Most prominent contemporary opponents of scientific realism 
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- such as Bas van Fraassen and Larry Laudan - do not criticize this 
framework. Rather, the contemporary debate on scientific realism hinges 
primarily on the axiological and epistemological claims noted above. These 
can be made more explicit: 
Axiological (Scientific) Realism: science aims, primarily, to express true 
statements about the world. 
Epistemic (Scientific) Realism: we can be justified in believing that 
successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. 
The majority of philosophers involved in the scientific realism debate 
assume that axiological realism rests on epistemic realism. In fact, so long 
as we take science to be successful, progressive, and rational, and so long as 
progress is determined by the achievement of (or the degree to which we 
approximate) our primary aim, truth, a defence of epistemic realism is 
required of any scientific realist. For this reason, the contemporary debate 
on scientific realism is, by and large, played out in the arena of epistemic 
realism. 
So long as we intetpret scientific theories literally, as the scientific realist 
advises, epistemic realism entails the claim that we are justified in believing 
that unobservable entities postulated by our successful theories exist. The 
type of inference that scientific realists usually put forward to support such 
a claim can be expressed as follows: The existence of an unobservable 
entity, D, (e.g., the electron) is the best explanation for the observable 
phenomena, 0 (e.g. observed electrical phenomena); therefore, we are 
justified in believing that D (e.g. the electron) exists. An argument of this 
sort is called an inference to the best explanation (mE). It is generally 
thought to be the mode of inference that grounds or provides justification 
for epistemic realism. 
Although IBE is employed to support our belief in the existence of 
unobservables, scientific realists maintain that it is not an 'exotic' mode of 
inference, utilized only by philosophers. They contend that scientists 
themselves employ mE. In fact, realists tell us, mE plays an integral role in 
our commonsense reasoning. Bas van Fraassen (though a non-realist) 
provides a nice example: 
I hear scratching in the wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese disappears -
and I infer that a mouse has come to live with me. Not merely that these apparent signs of 
mousely presence will continue, not merely that all the observable phenomena will be as 
if there is a mouse; but that there really is a mouse. (van Fraassen 1980, pp. 19-20) 
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Scientific realists seek to justify belief not merely in the existence of 
particular entities but in the (aproximate) truth of our scientific theories. 
Toward this end, they typically apply a robust version of IBE. This is the 
'no-miracles argument', made famous by Putnam (1975) - also known as 
the 'miracle argument,' the 'success argument' and the 'ultimate argument' 
- if our successful scientific theories were not at least approximately true, 
then their success would be a miracle. In other words, so long as we do not 
accept miracles as explanatory,3 the only (and thus the best) explanation for 
a theory's success is that the world is as the theory says it is. If we accept 
this argument, we appear to be led to epistemic realism. And since the 
belief that our theory is (approximately) true entails the belief that the 
entities postulated by the theory exist, the no-miracles argument justifies the 
latter in so far as it justifies the former. Thus the no-miracles argument 
warrants a far greater range of beliefs than would be warranted by any 
specific inference to the existence of an unobservable entity. 
Along with Alan Musgrave (1988), one could consider the no-miracles 
argument, as stated thus far, to be more akin to a slogan than an argument. 
Noting this, we are prompted to explicate it more precisely. Scientific 
realists typically claim that IBE is abductive, abduction being a form of 
reasoning famously articulated and advocated by C.S. Peirce (1958). Peirce 
construes abductive reasoning in the following way. We begin with a 
'surprising' observation, (Q). A state of affairs is postulated, and that 
postulate, (P), would render (Q) 'a matter of course'. We conclude that 'we 
have reason to suspect' that (P) obtains (1958, p. 189). 
While scientific realists often tip their hats to Peirce, when presenting the 
no-miracles argument, the way in which it is to be expressed as a Peircian 
abduction is neither obvious nor generally explicated. We can begin by 
inserting the central realist claims into Peirce's argument. The scientific 
realist wants to direct our attention to the 'surprising fact,' (Q), that we have 
successful scientific theories. According to scientific realists, if our theories 
were (approximately) true, (P), then (Q) would be 'a matter of course.' The 
epistemic realist draws a bolder conclusion than that drawn by Peirce. The 
epistemic realist infers, not merely that 'we have reason to suspect' (P), but 
that we are justified in believing (P). This extra step might be legitimised if 
the epistemic realist can show that (P) is probable. But on what grounds 
does the epistemic realist base such a claim? Namely, her assertion that, 
aside from (P), the only state of affairs that could bring about (Q) would be 
a miracle. With this key premise of the no-miracles argument, we are closer 
to formulating that argument as an abduction. However, at least a few more 
hidden premises must be made salient. 
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I: Our theories are successful, (Q) 
2: If our theories were (approximately) true, (P), then their success, (Q), 
would be a matter of course 
3: The relationship expressed in (2) shows that the (approximate) truth of 
our theories, (P), provides an explanation of their success, (Q) 
4: In fact, the (approximate) truth of our theories, (P), provides a good 
explanation of success, (Q) 
5: To say that success, (Q), occurs due to a miracle is to provide no 
explanation at all 
6: Aside from the (approximate) truth of our theories, (P), there is no 
other explanation available for their success, (Q) 
Therefore, (probably) our theories are (approximately) true, (P) 
Therefore, epistemic realism: we are justified in believing that our 
successful theories are (approximately) true, (P). 
Though it is a start, this modified abductive argument does not exhaust 
the list of presuppositions involved in the no-miracles argument. Premises 
(3), (4), and (6) surely need further clarification and support. And even 
including our new premises and their requisite support, the full set of 
premises would entail neither the initial, nor the subsequent, conclusion. 
Weare not logically compelled to infer from a phenomenon to its 
explanation, even if that explanation is the only one available. The argu-
ment, as a whole, is not deductively valid.4 The scientific realist will grant 
this and will remind us that certainty about the world of experience is an 
unattainable demand. The argument is only meant to ground epistemic 
realism. It doesn't tells us what we can be certain of, but only what we can 
be justified in believing. And again, says the scientific realist, it receives its 
legitimacy from its use, not only in science, but in everyday life. 
We have thus far been considering rather basic formulations of epistemic 
realism and the no-miracles argument. We can now note that scientific 
realists have introduced a number of variations of this inferential package. 
Some appeal to truth as the explanation of success (e.g., Wilfred Sellars 
(1962); Andre Kukla (1997)), while others appeal to approximate truth 
(e.g., Hilary Putnam (1975); Richard Boyd (1973). Some claim that truth 
(or approximate truth) is the only possible or available explanation for 
success (e.g., J. J. C. Smart (1968); Putnam (1975». Others (most contem-
porary scientific realists) claim the truth or approximate truth of our 
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theories to be the best explanation of success. Some scientific realists 
understand that which is being explained as the success of a given theory 
(e.g., Smart (1968); Musgrave (1985); Peter Lipton (1993), (1994)), while 
others see that which needs to be explained as being the success of science 
in general (e.g., Putnam (1975)). Some appeal to general predictive success 
(e.g. Putnam (1975); Boyd (1973); W. H. Newton-Smith (1981)), while 
others emphasize novel success (e.g., William Whewell (1840); Musgrave 
(1985), (1988); Lipton (1993), (1994); Stathis Psillos (1999); Howard 
Sankey (2001)). Some say we are justified in believing theories as wholes, 
while others focus on certain constituents of those theories (e.g., Philip 
Kitcher (1993), Psillos (1999); Sankey (2001)). 
It is noteworthy that many scientific realists see their philosophy to be an 
'overarching empirical hypothesis.' Scientific realism is taken to be an 
empirically testable position that shares the virtues of a scientific theory. 
Acknowledging this, we can clarify epistemic realism further. Epistemic 
realism is the thesis that we can be justified in believing the hypothesis that 
our successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. 
With a framework in hand for understanding the position of scientific 
realism let us identify three important contemporary objections to that 
position. One is directed at the no-miracles argument specifically. Some 
non-realists contend that the scientific realist has put forward a false 
dichotomy. In seeking an explanation for the success of scientific theories, 
we need not make a choice between appealing to miracles and inferring that 
our theories are (approximately) true. Alternative explanations are available 
(challenging premise 6 above). For example, van Fraassen (1980) presents a 
Darwinian alternative: success is a requirement for a theory's survival; we 
simply wouldn't have retained our theories were they not successful. Other 
alternatives are offered by Laudan (1985), Rescher (1987), Fine (1984), 
Lyons (this volume), Worrall (1989), and Carrier (l991); (l993). Such 
alternative explanations deflate the motivation for inferring the epistemic 
realist hypothesis. They thus cut at the heart of epistemic realism. In reply, 
the epistemic realist often claims that (approximate) truth provides a better 
explanation than the non-realist contenders. Or she draws attention to a new 
'surprising fact' (e.g., to novel success) and denies the non-realist's ability 
to explain it. 
Another non-realist argument is the argument from the underdeter-
mination of theories by data (Duhem (1906), Quine (1975), van Fraassen 
(1980)). In its basic formulation, this argument proceeds as follows. Any 
successful theory will have a high (if not infinite) number of empirically 
equivalent, yet incompatible, rivals. Since each of these rivals will share the 
empirical success of our preferred theory, we cannot be justified in 
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believing one theory over the others. So, despite the success of our 
preferred theory, we cannot be justified in believing that it is true. In 
response, some scientific realists deny that we can generate empirically 
equivalent rivals for every theory. The debate on this matter continues (see, 
for instance, Kukla (1997)). Another realist strategy is to argue that 
empirical success is not the only epistemically relevant virtue. We can still 
select among our theories by appeal to supra-empirical virtues such as 
simplicity. Non-realists challenge the assumption that these supra-empirical 
virtues bear on truth (e.g., van Fraassen, (1980)), thus questioning whether 
they can be legitimately employed as a justification for belief. 
A third important non-realist argument is historical. This argument takes 
seriously the claim that scientific realism provides an empirically testable 
hypothesis. It begins with a list of successful theories that cannot, by 
present lights, be construed as true, or even approximately true. The most 
commonly discussed version of this argument is known as the pessimistic 
meta-induction: we have had many successful theories that have now turned 
out to be false; so our present-day theories will be likely to turn out to be 
false as well (Putnam (1984); Rescher (1987); Laudan (1977)). A second 
version involves employing the list, not as fuel for an induction toward the 
falsity of our theories, but as a set of empirical data that directly counters 
scientific realism. (See Laudan (1981), as interpreted by Lyons (this 
volume).) 
This edited collection contains a number of papers that engage in 
contemporary debates about scientific realism in one way or another. Some 
participants in debates about scientific realism have sought compromises 
between scientific realism and full-blown antirealism. On possible com-
promise is to adopt realism about the existence of some of the entities 
described in scientific theories, without grounding that realism in realism 
about the truth of scientific theories. This form of compromise is known as 
entity realism. Entity realism is typically grounded in an epistemology that 
privileges truth claims that are based on experimental manipulation. Robert 
Nola considers two explanationist arguments toward such a realism: a 
variation of the no-miracles argument and an inference to the most probable 
cause. Nola seeks, however, to extend realism further, arguing that we are 
justified in believing in the existence of some non-manipulated entities. He 
contends that, while explanationist arguments may prove inadequate in 
respect to such entities, there remains a strong probabilistic argument that 
will, in the appropriate circumstances, lead us to realism about both 
manipulated and non-manipulated entities. While other entity realists, such 
as Nancy Cartwright (1983), have considered themselves to be opponents of 
scientific realism, Nola offers us a means to bridge the gap between entity 
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realism and theory realism. Along with Cartwright (1983), Steve Clarke 
(2001) defends an entity realism about manipulated entities while rejecting 
realism about fundamental scientific theories. Here he continues to make a 
case for an entity realism, which remains unreconciled with scientific 
realism, defending Nancy Cartwright's account of entity realism in the face 
of criticisms of it due to Alan Chalmers. 
Harold Kincaid argues that both sides of the realist debate employ, at 
least tacitly, the following assumptions: the rules of scientific inference are 
global and the justification for these rules is philosophical. He challenges 
these assumptions by way of an in-depth adjudication between Bayesians 
and error-statisticians: He contends that both statistical approaches require 
the case-by-case assessment of empirical factors, the relevance of which has 
been largely unacknowledged. Drawing on his fmdings here, he proposes, 
an alternative form of scientific realism that is contextualised to particular 
domains and requires domain-specific empirical data. 
Timothy Lyons criticises a variety of truth-based formulations of 
scientific realism. He clarifies the nature of the threatening historical 
argument against realism and makes explicit the implications that hold at 
each level of realism. He shows that numerous novel successes have come 
from false theories, thus that the realist's frequent appeal to novel success 
does not solve the historical problem. He also considers an alternative 
explanation for success, and challenges the key explanatory premise of the 
realist's argument, as it stands once the realist retreats to approximate truth. 
Strengthening the evidence for the historical argument against realism, 
Keith Hutchison undertakes an in-depth case study of W. J. M. Rankine's 
oft neglected, yet surprisingly successful, 19th century vortex theory of 
heat. Against a sophisticated form of the no-miracles argument, he contends 
that Rankine's theory contains a number of false theoretical claims that were 
centrally employed in the derivation of its successful predictions. 
Putnam's no-miracles argument, in its full formulation, is carefully un-
packed by Michel Ghins. Preferring a philosophically grounded realism, 
Ghins argues against realists, such as Putnam, who construe their position 
to be scientifically or naturalistically grounded. Realism does not have the 
status of a scientific theory; for, among other problems, according to Ghins, 
truth is not explanatory. John Wright identifies three surprising features of 
science that seem to call for explanation: the surprising novel successes of 
our theories; the true descriptions of parts of the world that were, at the time 
described, unobserved; and the extended empirical success of theories that 
are initially preferred for their a priori preferable properties. He works his 
way through a series of proposals that have been, or might be, put forward 
to explain these phenomena, and he contends that none are suited to the 
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task. Brian Ellis articulates a metaphysics for a specific type of scientific 
realism, which he calls a causal process entity realism. Along the way, he 
employs his own version of the no-miracles argument to justify the view 
that the world has a natural kind structure. Our discussion of the papers in 
this volume will be continued below. 
We have seen above that, underlying the scientific realism debate, are a 
number of foundational tenets. Some of these are essential to our 
commonsense conception of reality, for instance, the thesis that we interact 
with an 'external' world and that our basic beliefs about observable entities 
are warranted. Also, we have seen that the scientific realist draws on 
commonsense in her attempt to legitimise abduction, the mode of reasoning 
on which her position rests. We now attend more directly to commonsense. 
2. SCIENCE AND COMMONSENSE 
We can understand commonsense as the conceptual framework that 
ordinary people share. It is the set of, often implicit, assumptions that the 
majority utilise when they interpret the world and the behaviour of their 
fellows. We do not believe that everyone has commonsense, but nor do we 
believe that commonsense is in short supply. Commonsense has two main 
components.5 First, it involves a strident form of naive realism. If we see 
and feel a wooden table in front of us, then it is plain commonsense to 
believe that a wooden table exists, which we are seeing and feeling. Second, 
commonsense involves the acceptance and utilisation of the psychology of 
rational agency, both for self-description and for the interpretation of the 
behaviour of others. It is commonsensical to believe that people's behaviour 
is, in the main, goal oriented and that the structure of an individual's beliefs 
and desires can be appealed to in order to explain why they do what they 
do. The belief that newspapers can be purchased at newsagencies and the 
desire to have a newspaper are appealed to by commonsense to explain why 
a person went to a newsagency and bought a newspaper. 
Because commonsense involves a commitment to the mind-independent 
reality of objects in the world it is most directly opposed to skeptical and 
idealist antirealisms. The best known advocates of commonsense in the 
history of philosophy, Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and G. E. Moore (1873-
1958), are also mostly concerned to oppose idealist and skeptical argu-
ments. Reid and his followers, the Scottish Commonsense School, develop 
arguments to buttress the metaphysical stance of commonsense, and to 
expose the weaknesses of Humean skepticism and Berkeleyan idealism. 
Moore, who was most directly opposed to the idealism of Bradley and other 
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British idealists, did not so much elaborate the naive realism of common-
sense, as exemplify the force of appeals to commonsense and the con-
comitant weakness of philosophical arguments that opposed commonsense. 
Famously, Moore's method of refuting skepticism was to hold up his hand 
and say 'here is a hand'. In effect, Moore argued that we are more confident 
that we are in possession of hands, when we see and feel them, than we 
could be confident of the force of any possible philosophical argument that 
defies our commonsensical judgement that we have hands. 
Science conceptualises the ordinary objects and agents of the world very 
differently from commonsense. Where commonsense assures us that there 
is a solid wooden table in front of us, physicists tell us there exists a lattice 
of microscopic particles, punctuated by comparatively large areas of empty 
space. Where commonsense tells us that rational agents act on their beliefs 
and desires, science tells us that brain events take place that cause their 
actions. Philosophical defenders of commonsense do not dismiss science in 
the same way that they dismiss anti-realist metaphysics. They typically 
argue for the compatibility of science and commonsense, insisting that the 
table of commonsense is, despite appearances, identical with the table of 
physics. But even a cursory knowledge of current science ought to make us 
aware that this compatibility is far from unproblematic. Physicists tell us 
that the fundamental particles of physics are not the small, solid, enduring, 
spatio-temporally located particles of commonsense, but are in fact a 
mixture of particles and waves vaguely distributed through a region. It is 
not obvious that this scientific conception of matter can be fully reconciled 
with the commonsense conception of matter. 
Wilfrid Sellars is one philosopher who doubted that commonsense and 
science could be fully reconciled. He suggested that commonsense should 
give way to science in so far as the two prove to be incompatible. The 
argument is to be found in his highly influential essay, 'Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man' (Sellars 1962). There he argues that we possess 
two unreconciled 'images' of man-in-the-world. These are the 'manifest 
image', and the 'scientific image'. Sellars deliberately chose the word 
'image' because it is 'usefully ambiguous' (1962, p. 41). However, since he 
holds that the aim of philosophy is to '... understand how things in the 
broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible 
sense of the term.' (1962, p. 37), it would seem that an understanding of the 
two images as world-views, or explanatory frameworks, cannot be too far 
from what he intends. 
Sellars' manifest image is not commonsense itself, but the refinement of 
commonsense that philosophers and other intellectuals have developed over 
the centuries. Sellars regards most philosophy as being in the business of 
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refining the commonsense view of the world. He nominates the work of 
analytic philosophers influenced by the later Wittgenstein as being the 
philosophy that has 'increasingly succeeded in isolating [the manifest 
image] in something like its pure form' (1962, p. 51). If the manifest image 
were to have to be modified or discarded due to the influence of science, 
then, because the manifest image is a refmement of commonsense, it 
appears that we would have to modify or discard commonsense along with 
it. 
The scientific image is not science itself, but our current conception of 
the world that science makes present to us. The scientifIc image is an image 
of a world of microscopic particles and fields and forces, obeying statistical 
laws. The scientific image accounts for the manifest image, but only to an 
extent. We can provide a scientific explanation for why the sun appears red 
when it sets: The light rays, which we observe, are emitted by the sun at 
particular frequencies; these are frequencies that are then affected by the 
Earth's atmosphere in different ways, depending on their particular angles 
relative to the Earth's surface. By accepting this explanation we appear to 
sacrifice our ability to provide an account of the phenomenal character of 
redness, as it is experienced by us, in terms that are unified with the terms 
used in our explanation of the behaviour of light. Similarly, an explanation 
of how mental activity is caused by brain events is not in itself an 
explanation of our own experiences of conscious deliberation. It seems that 
some of the most important qualities of the manifest image have no 
counterparts in the scientific image. 
We might, as scientific realists often hope, be able to integrate the 
manifest and the scientific images, or we might reject one in favour of the 
other. Currently, though, we do neither of these things. Instead we flit back 
and forth between the two unintegrated images. When we look at a sunset 
we admire the beauty of its rich red hues. When we explain the appearance 
of the sunset we are satisfied to say that, for most people, redness happens 
to covary with a complex of particular frequencies of light. The manifest 
image and the scientific image observe an uneasy truce, but it is not obvious 
that this truce can last in the long term. As the scientific image comes to 
assume an ever greater importance to us, it becomes ever more tempting to 
reject those aspects of the manifest image with which it cannot be 
reconciled. Eliminativist philosophers, such as the Churchlands (1998), 
urge us to give in to this temptation. If commonsense talk of belief and 
desires has no apparent place in the scientific image, so much the worse for 
talk of beliefs and desires, according to eliminativists. Better, they maintain, 
that we retrain ourselves to describe our inner life in the scientific language 
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of brain science, than remain trapped by the archaic language of the 
manifest image. 
In recent times the reputation of commonsense reasoning has been 
undermined, to an extent, by the investigations of psychologists. Reid 
assured us that the reliability of 'natural judgement' is self evident; however 
Tversky and Kahneman' s examinations of lay judgments in statistics appear 
to demonstrate that, left to its own devices, natural judgement will lead to a 
disturbing variety of statistical errors. For example, natural judgement is 
guilty of continually overestimating the likelihood of conjunctive events 
and continually underestimating the likelihood of disjunctive events 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Social psychologists, such as Ross and 
Nisbett (1991) allege that our natural judgments about our fellows are 
systematically in error. We persistently suppose that the personalities of 
other people make a greater causal contribution to their behaviour than 
available evidence suggests. A third area in which natural judgement has 
been found wanting, by psychology, is in folk physics. Our natural 
judgement is that, if we impart a force on an object by tying it to a string 
and accelerating it in an arc, it will continue to move in an arc when we let 
go of the string (McCloskey 1983). It is no surprise that natural judgement 
does not accommodate the deep mysteries of quantum mechanics. 
However, it comes as something of a shock to discover that natural 
judgement has not even managed to accommodate itself to Newtonian 
mechanics, remaining partially in the grip of a naive impetus theory of 
motion. 
Against those who charge that the natural judgment of commonsense is 
importantly defective, there are two main lines of defence. The fIrst is to 
reject the coherence of the charge. Davidson (1984), and those influenced 
by him, argue that, in order to meaningfully interpret behaviour at all, we 
have no choice but to assume that others are substantially rational and that 
their beliefs are for-the-most-part true, as are our own. If Davidsonian 
views about interpretation are right then it seems that there is no possibility 
of consistently mounting an attack on the rationality of commonsense. We 
are trapped into believing that commonsense judgments are rational, on 
pain of undermining our own claims to be arguing rationally.6 
The second line of defence, which has been pursued by Gigerenzer et. al. 
(1999), is to downplay the importance of the various experiments that 
purport to demonstrate signifIcant failures of human reasoning. Our per-
formance in solving some abstract problems has been shown to be poor, but 
the extent to which these failures are representative of human reasoning in 
situations that we actually encounter is an open question. It may be that our 
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failures in abstract experimental situations are the minor side effects of 
heuristics that enable us to succeed in solving real-life problems. 
Science began as an extension of commonsense, and it retains strong 
continuities with commonsense reasoning. Scientists are typically not 
trained to practice methods that are at odds with commonsense. However, 
science gives us a platform from which to challenge our commonsense 
judgements. Perhaps commonsense will turn out to be a ladder that we 
discard once we fully embrace the scientific image. As science develops, so 
does the scientific image, and so do tensions between it and the manifest 
image. So too do threats to the reputation of commonsense psychology and 
to the plausibility of commonsense realism. 
In part, contemporary science is in conflict with commonsense. Because 
scientific realists seek to justify our belief in the claims of successful 
science, contemporary scientific realism also runs into conflict with 
commonsense. However, scientific realism is committed to the common-
sensical view that there are mind-independent objects residing in an 
'external' world; and the proponents of scientific realism appeal to 
commonsense practices to justify their use of abduction. So there is a 
tension in contemporary scientific realism. Scientific realism both conflicts 
with and relies on commonsense. It is becoming increasingly important for 
scientific realists to address this tension and clarify the extent to which they 
remain committed to the conceptual framework and inferential methods of 
commonsense. 
The theme of the enduring place of commonsense reasoning in science, 
and indeed in debates about scientific realism, is exemplified in several of 
the papers in this collection. Harold Kincaid argues that the case for realism 
in given domains of scientific practice is one that is established context-
ually. This is because, he holds, scientific inference is empirical and social 
in ways that are not captured by the 'logic of science' ideal. If Kincaid is 
right that there is no universal logic of science, then it would appear that 
scientific inference cannot, in general, be sharply distinguished from 
commonsense reasoning. 
Robert Nola defends the commonsensical appeal to manipulability as a 
mark of the real, as does Steve Clarke (200 I). This appeal is at the heart of 
most cases for entity realism. Entity realism is commonly associated with 
Ian Hacking's (1983, p. 23) catchcry, 'if you can spray them then they are 
real', however its roots lie in the anti-theoretical traditions of pragmatism 
and in the commonsensical reaction to Berkeley's idealism made famous by 
Samuel Johnson. When Johnson manipulated a stone with his foot he at 
once affirmed that the stone was more than a mere theoretical construct and 
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that he was warranted in applying commonsense reasoning to affmn its 
existence. 
We have already seen the tensions between science and commonsense 
expressed in Sellar's talk of the scientific and the manifest image. In the 
tradition of Peirce and Dewey, Hennan De Regt takes a pragmatist point of 
view, regarding talk of the two images. He argues that the two images are 
reconciled in a scientific attitude properly understood as being grounded in 
commonsense. Brian Ellis seeks to recast talk of the two images in the 
tenninology of the new essentialism, which he advocates (Ellis 2001). Ellis 
argues that the aspects of the manifest image, such as consciousness, that 
have traditionally been thought to be lost in the scientific image can be 
understood as part of the scientific image after all, when we adopt 
essentialism. 
A general problem for defenders of commonsense is presented by the 
psychological evidence already discussed, which threatens to undennine the 
credibility of our everyday reasoning. A specific problem for the character-
isation of a defensible version of commonsense psychology is presented by 
the phenomenon of delusion. Lisa Bortolotti argues that delusions are best 
understood as irrational beliefs involving resistance to contrary evidence 
and compartmentalisation. Her argument serves to narrow the gap between 
the epistemology of delusional and non-delusional believers. In doing so it 
contributes to the analysis of commonsense psychology. 7 
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NOTES 
lAlthough Putnam (1981) (1982a) (1982b) and Ellis (1990) (1996) advocate an epistemic 
notion of truth, they both consider themselves to be scientific realists. 
2We use the term 'most' here to allow for exceptions such as 'perfectly reversible heat 
engines.' 
3For an argument to the conclusion that appeals to the miraculous can be explanatory see 
Clarke (1997). 
4In fact, non-realists, such as Laudan (1981), point out that if we treat the argument as a 
deduction it commits the fallacy of affinning the consequent: if (P), then (Q); (Q); therefore, 
(P). This can be seen most easily by focusing on I and 2 and reversing their order. 
2: If our theories were (approximately) true, (P), then their success, (Q), would be a 
matter of course. 
I: Our theories are successful, (Q) 
Therefore, (probably) our theories are (approximately) true, (P). 
Some say the argument can be made deductively valid (e.g., Musgrave, 1988), but this 
comes only at the cost of adding further contentious assumptions, e.g., a premise which 
states that we are justifed in believing that the best explanation of a phenomenon is true. 
S Here we are following Forguson, (1989, Chapter I). 
6The charge that attempts to identifY widespread human irrationality must be self-
undermining is further explored by Stein (1997). 
7Thanks to Keith Horton for useful comments on draft material. 
